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Abstract 
Non-racialism as a concept has a rich and contentious history in South African politics. For 
many it was a core feature of the struggle against apartheid, uniting a range of forces fighting 
for a society free from racial discrimination. Indeed it is a central tenet in South Africa’s 
Constitution, forming a core part of the ‘founding provisions’ of the country. However, there is 
widespread contestation over what the concept entails, both theoretically and in practical terms. 
This article examines the concept of non-racialism primarily through the lens of South Africa’s 
largest political opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), but relates its approach to that 
of the African National Congress (ANC). How has the DA conceptualised and instrumentalised 
the vision of non-racialism, historically and in post-apartheid South Africa? This article argues 
that neither the DA nor the ANC has been able to do so coherently. The idea of non-racialism is 
a fracture that deeply divides both parties; this division is also one that originated historically 
for both parties. The article concludes that there is a clear shift in how the DA envisaged 
non-racialism during apartheid and how the party instrumentalises the concept today, and 
that this change echoes, to some extent, the experiences of the ANC. Both parties now equate 
non-racialism to multiracialism, on the one hand, and a (interim) racialisation of politics on 
the other. This raises the question of whether non-racialism, as conceived by some in the early 
days of the Congress alliance, is a dying ideal. 
 
Understanding Non-Racialism: The Definition of a Contested Concept 
Race is a central fissure that runs through the core of South African society. Although 
there are many concepts one can use to interrogate the importance of race and its place in 
South African history, the idea of non-racialism is perhaps primary among these. For many 
anti-apartheid activists, such as Ahmed Kathrada, the concept of non-racialism sat at the 
heart of the ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle.1 Non-racialism became a central, if contested, 
feature of the ANC after it adopted the Freedom Charter in March 1956, which stated that 
‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’.2 The history of non-racialism, 
                                                          
1 Interview with Ahmed Kathrada, 7 July 2011, Johannesburg. Methodologically, this article is not largely based on empirical research 
or fieldwork; however, where appropriate, the author uses information from interviews she conducted with elite informants between 
2011 and 2014. In each case, the interviewee consented to the interview material being used for publication. All interviews for this 
article were conducted by the author, unless otherwise stated. 
2 ANC, ‘The Freedom Charter’, available at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72, retrieved 5 July 2012; D. Everatt, The Origins of 
Non-Racialism: White Opposition to Apartheid in the 1950s (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2009), p. 198. 
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however, has a longer past, rooted, according to ANC activists such as Kathrada, in the 
relations between different (race-based) anti-apartheid Congresses formed between 1894 
and 1938. Today non-racialism in enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution as one of the key 
values on which the state is founded.3  
 
The concept of non-racialism, however, has no fixed meaning, although attempts have been 
made to explain how the idea is defined and applied in South Africa.4 For some, the concept 
has lost meaning, ideologically and practically, it is ‘blurrily aspirational’ but has no socio- 
political or economic project driving it.5 For others, non-racialism is seen as still contributing 
to an emancipatory project. Non-racialism relates to the essentialisation of race (as race has a 
profound presence in history and current social relations), which is necessary in order to achieve 
a state of being where race does not exist.6 This state of being is ontologically related to the 
idea that, within the strict meaning of non-racialism, there are no such things as biologically 
or genetically determined, and objectively verifiable, meaningful categories called races. In 
other words, races are products of social construction and, as such, we can overcome these 
social constructions.7 From this perspective, non-racialism is (whether today or in the long 
term) about rejecting race thinking and racialism. Race is a social construct: ‘biologically it is 
absolute nonsense but you have to get to the point where it is socially nonsense as well’.8 This 
does not mean, however, that one must deny the effects of racism. Here ‘racialism’ refers to 
the idea that ‘there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which 
allow us to divide them into small sets of races’.9  
 
For most South Africans, it is common reality that race relations are embedded in everyday 
thinking and experience. Another interpretation of non-racialism, then, refers to the idea of 
non-racialisation, where racialisation is the interpretation of events, discourses and 
motivations in terms of race.10 One can support the idea of non-racialism and still hold on to 
the importance of accepting and embracing multiple identities. This bonds the idea of non-
racialism to that of multiracialism. There are different interpretations of multiracialism,11 but, 
in the South African context, multiracialism is equated by Maré to a society of more than 
one race, where it is perceived that there are essential differences between these race groups.12 
Although differences are recognisable through racial appearance, multiracialism does not 
                                                          
3 Republic of South Africa Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. 
4 Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism; G. Maré, ‘“Non-Racialism” in the Struggle against Apartheid’, Society in Transition, 34, 1 
(2003); M. MacDonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa (Scottsville, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006); R. Taylor, ‘South 
Africa: From “Race” to Non-Racialism?’, in P. Ratcliff (ed.), ‘Race’, Ethnicity and Nation: International Perspectives on Social 
Conflict (London, UCL Press, 1994); R. Suttner, ‘Understanding Non-Racialism as an Emancipatory Concept in South Africa’, Theoria, 
59, 130 (2012), pp. 22–41. 
5 D. Everatt, ‘Non-Racialism in South Africa: Status and Prospects’, presentation to Ahmed Kathrada Foundation conference, ‘Non-
Racialism in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Contemporary Meanings and Relevance’, 13 October 2011, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, p. 6; see also R. Taylor ‘Deepening Non-Racialism in South Africa’, Politikon, 39, 1 (2012), pp. 41–51. 
6 Suttner, ‘Understanding Non-Racialism’. 
7 Maré, ‘“Non-Racialism”’ in the Struggle’. 
8 Interview with Derek Hanekom, Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, 1 August 2011, Pretoria. 
9 K.A. Appiah, ‘The Conservation of “Race”, Black American Literature Forum, 23, 1 (1989), pp. 34–60, quoted in G. Maré, ‘“Non-
Racialism” in the Struggle’, p. 2. Racism, on the other hand, is defined by Maré as the attribution of negative qualities to a particular 
person who meets the racists’ physical criteria (normally skin colour) for categorisation. 
10 Maré, ‘“Non-Racialism”’ in the Struggle’, p.2. 
11 See, for example, A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994). 
12 G. Maré, ‘Making a Distinction’, The Witness, Pietermaritzburg, 23 September 2009. 
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embrace the idea that one race is superior to another. Those South Africans who support the 
idea of multiracialism implicitly embrace the idea of socially constructed racial categories; 
however, in some cases they see this as a step towards achieving a society that looks beyond 
race.13 This article will address how the DA relates to these approaches to non-racialism: 
are they non-essentialist, seeing race as a social construct, multiracial or a combination of 
both, and how does this relate to the perspectives of the key liberation movement and current 
ruling party, the ANC? 
 
 
 
The Democratic Alliance and Race: Historical Roots 
The DA, through its predecessors the Progressive Party (PP), Progressive Reform Party, 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and Democratic Party (DP), has deep and somewhat 
controversial roots in South African society.14 Early iterations of the DA operated under the 
apartheid regime, while opposing apartheid laws. This created a ‘white’15 opposition towards 
apartheid that changed into a more conventional liberal opposition to the ANC after the 
transition to a constitutional democracy. The party continued to evolve through its electoral 
battles and through building relationships with other political entities. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of the DA from apartheid roots to its contemporary formation. 
 
The parties historically did not expressly refer to the concept of non-racialism, and so 
their approach to the idea will largely be teased out through interrogating their political and 
                                                          
13 F. Anciano-White and J. Selemani, ‘Rethinking Non-Racialism: Reflections of a Selection of South Africa Leaders’, Politikon, 39, 1 
(2012), pp. 149–69. 
14 This article argues that the DA can be presented as a party with a history stretching back to the apartheid era, as the liberal PP, PFP 
and DP are early precursors of the current DA. This follows the DA’s own description of its history according to its 2014 election 
campaign, ‘Know Your DA’, available at http://www.da.org.za/campaign/ know-your-da/roots/, retrieved 27 May 2015. 
15 For clarity, this article will use racial nomenclature that broadly aligns with apartheid categorisations. According to the 1950 
Population Registration Act, the term ‘white’ refers to someone ‘who in appearance is, or who is generally accepted as, a white person, 
but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a Coloured person’. The 
term black (and non-white) refers to racial groups that were not categorised as white (e.g. coloured, black African, Indian) while ‘Black 
African’ is akin to the apartheid label ‘Bantu’. Following Seekings, ‘coloured’ is a varied, composite category that includes the 
descendants of relationships between white and black African people, the descendants of ‘Malay’ slaves brought from south-east Asia, 
and descendants of the indigenous Khoi and San, who lived in the Western Cape before the arrival of either white or black African 
people; see J. Seekings, ‘The Continuing Salience of Race: Discrimination and Diversity in South Africa’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, 26, 1 (2008), p. 3. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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economic policies. Through the multiple twists and turns in the historical development of 
the DA, there is one clear strand, however: all the parties broadly supported the ideology of 
liberalism. Understanding how the precursors to the DA interpreted and applied liberal ideology 
is essential to understanding their relationship to the idea of non-racialism. 
 
Non-Racialism as Universal Equality 
One of the earliest ways in which the PP addressed the concept of non-racialism was through 
its approach to constitutionalism and a Bill of Rights. In keeping with core classical liberal 
values, the party was the first in the apartheid parliament to produce a new comprehensive 
constitutional model under the guidance of the 1960s’ Molteno Commission. The Commission 
believed enforced separation (and enforced integration) between races was undesirable, and 
that ‘free individual choice in all matters of social intercourse’ should be encouraged.16  An 
important aspect of the Commission relating to non-racialism was its support for a Bill of 
Rights.17 After the Molteno Commission, ‘a Bill of Rights became the political darling of the 
liberal cause’.18 In this reading, the PP and DP clearly rejected discrimination towards blacks 
that would impact on their individual human rights. 
 
The liberal idea that non-racialism is about rejecting racial discrimination resonates to a 
large extent with one way in which the ANC historically conceptualised non-racialism: that of 
a unifying, nation-building project that transcends ascribed racial differences, while a second 
approach focused on (a contested idea of) African nationalism. The first view is rooted in the 
idea that different Congresses (the Natal Indian Congress, formed in 1894; the ANC, formed 
in 1912, the Communist Party, formed in 1921, and the Non-European United Front, formed in 
1938) all worked together to overcome apartheid and, in doing so, fostered non-racial 
relations.19 Activists argue that the Congress Alliance played a vital role in the adoption of 
non-racialism as a founding principle of the Freedom Charter.20 Assumptions that the idea of 
non-racialism equated to rejecting racialism cannot be made uncritically, however. The Charter 
itself states that ‘All National Groups shall have Equal Rights!’, which indicates support for 
racial differentiation rather than an anti-essentialist view of non-racialism. Nevertheless, early 
statements and speeches of Luthuli recurrently calling for a ‘common society’ validate the 
idea that the ANC viewed non-racialism (in one interpretation) as central to a universalised, 
generic humanism.21 As the head of a national liberation movement, the ANC was, according 
to Pallo Jordan, an advocate of an inclusive South African nationhood, rooted in the 
‘universalistic, liberatory outlook of modernity’ and the realities and imperatives of 
accommodation of all South African races, given that they shared a common territory.22 In this 
line of thinking, it is argued that non-racialism was the ‘unbreakable thread’ between the ANC 
                                                          
16 Bruckner de Villiers Research, The Rebirth of White Political Opposition in South Africa (Johannesburg, Bruckner de Villiers 
Research, 1975). 
17 S. Dubow, ‘South Africa and South Africans: Nationality, Belonging, Citizenship’, in R. Ross, A. Kelk Mager, and B. Nasson (eds), 
The Cambridge History of South Africa: Volume 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 58; C. Eglin, Crossing the 
Borders of Power: The Memoirs of Colin Eglin (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2007), p. 100. 
18 J. Dugard, ‘The Quest for a Liberal Democracy in South Africa’, Acta Juridica, 237 (1987), pp. 237–58. 
19 Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism. 
20 Interview with Laloo Chiba, conducted by Johnny Selemani, Johannesburg, 14 July 2011. 
21 Suttner, ‘Understanding Non-Racialism’. 
22 P. Jordan, ‘The National Question in Post 1994 South Africa’, Discussion Documents (1997), available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2352, retrieved 13 November 2012. 
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and other alliance members, and that the demand for a non-racial South Africa was the 
common ground that united a wide range of forces for change, including the ANC and its 
alliance partners. Thus the goal of the struggle was a democratic, restructured society where 
people are not differentiated according to racial criteria.23  
 
More recent documents, such as the 1991 Constitutional Principles for a Democratic South 
Africa, continue to reflect the values attributed to non-racialism of unity, equality and non- 
essentialisation of race, where it argues that a ‘non-racial South Africa means a South Africa 
in which all the artificial barriers and assumptions which kept people apart and maintained 
domination, are removed. In its negative sense, non-racial means the elimination of all colour 
bars. In positive terms it means the affirmation of equal rights for all’.24 Thus, in this 
interpretation, ANC anti-apartheid politics was characterised by a universalist orientation which 
focused on equal dignity for all individuals, regardless of real or imagined differences.25 These 
values attributed to non-racialism indicated an aspiration by the ANC to transcend recognised 
and ascribed racial differences. Indeed MacDonald argues that the ANC’s non-racialism ‘affirms 
liberal democratic values … and rejects the right of the state to impose group identities on 
citizens’.26  
 
This construction of non-racialism has, however, always been contested within the party, 
particularly where it sits in tension with the concept of African nationalism. The exclusive 
African nationalism of many prominent ANC Youth League (ANCYL) members of the 1940s to 
some extent challenged the universalist notion of non-racialism. The ANCYL argued that ‘the 
national liberation of Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves’.27 Although by no means 
a straightforward theory, there was a sense that an ideology of African nationalism needed to be 
developed that could ‘rouse the African masses to awareness and action’28 regardless of whether 
it sat in tension with a different reading of non-racialism. Conflicting views over the meaning 
and practice of African nationalism is not exclusive to the ANC. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni states, 
 
African nationalism was underpinned by very deep antinomies of black liberation thought 
that have continued to provoke competing views of the nation, contested definitions of 
citizenship, different imaginations of democracy and disagreements on the teleology of that 
national liberation struggle itself.29  
 
Indeed, Everatt argues that the fact that non-racialism survived the ‘internal ructions of 
nationalist politics’ is ‘near miraculous’. Ultimately the party was able to reach some measure 
of accommodation of both ideals of African nationalism and non-racialism, although Everatt 
                                                          
23 J. Frederikse, The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1990), pp. 3–4, 13. 
24 ANC, ‘Constitutional Principles For A Democratic South Africa’ (1991), available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/centenary/main.php?id=35&p=5, retrieved 14 November 2012. 
25 F. Cachalia, ‘Revisiting the National Question and Identity’, Politikon, 39, 1 (2012), p. 59. 
26 MacDonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa, p. 115. 
27 D. Everatt, ‘Non-Racialism in South Africa: Status and Prospects’, Politikon, 39, 1 (2012), p. 15. 
28 Cited in A. Johnston, South Africa: Inventing the Nation (London, Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 76. 
29 S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Africa for Africans or Africa for “Natives” Only? “New Nationalism” and Nativism in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa’, Africa Spectrum, 44, 1 (2009), p. 64. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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maintains that non-racialism was left as a passive assertion that stood in moral opposition to 
racism, while African nationalism became the engine that drove the liberation struggle.30  
 
The contestation over the theory and instrumentalisation of non-racialism in the ANC is 
further exemplified by the fact that, for much of its history, the ANC was organised in practice 
along lines more multiracial (separate but equal) than non-racial.31 For Suttner, ‘[a]s the ANC 
developed … there has been continual tension between its growing universal aspirations and 
its mode of organisation that remained racialised, right up until the late 1960s’.32 This may 
have been necessary, given the socio-historical context,33 none the less there were extensive 
debates in the party before it was agreed that membership of the ANC could be open to all 
races. This took place in 1969, 57 years after the movement was founded, and it was only in 
1985 that ‘non-Africans’ were eligible to sit on the National Executive Committee (NEC).34 
And indeed, even with closed racial membership, the ANC’s willingness to work with other 
races in the struggle contributed to the formation of the breakaway Pan Africanist Congress in 
1959.35 This stance was in direct contrast to parties that are perhaps true flag-bearers of 
non- racialism: the disbanded Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and the reconstituted 
South African Communist Party (SACP). Both always had racially mixed membership. 
Indeed the ANC resisted the attempt by the CPSA to bypass existing national organisations 
and create a permanent ‘unity movement’, as,the ANC felt that this emphasised class 
above national consciousness. The CPSA and SACP none the less played a pivotal role in 
challenging the ANC’s approach to non-racialism, by frequently calling for the 
transformation of existing separate national organisations and the formation of a non-
racial assembly.36 It is clear that there were ongoing tensions in the ANC regarding the 
meaning and instrumentalisation of non-racialism; however, as the political analyst Johnston 
notes, a liberal version of non-racialism provided a convenient and globally acceptable 
concept. The ANC may have wanted to portray this version of non-racialism to some 
audiences to generate global (and where possible local) support for a national liberation 
struggle.37  
 
Returning to the PP, its support for universalised non-racialism in a Bill of Rights was, 
however, equivocal, as the Molteno Commission called for a system of qualified franchise rather 
than universal franchise. The franchise policy proposed giving the vote to all South Africans 
over the age of 21, provided they met minimum educational, income or property qualifications. 
A supplementary voters’ roll would be in place for those who did not qualify but who could 
pass a literacy test in one of the official languages38 (the predominantly white mother-tongue 
                                                          
30 Everatt, ‘Non-Racialism in South Africa: Status and Prospects’, p. 16. 
31 Suttner, ‘Understanding Non-Racialism’; N. Ndebele, ‘The African National Congress and the Policy of Non-Racialism: A Study of 
the Membership Issue’, Politikon, 29, 2 (2002), pp. 133–46. 
32 Suttner, ‘Understanding Non-Racialism’, pp. 25–6. 
33 See A. Kathrada, ‘Preface’, Politikon, 39, 1 (2012) p. 3. 
34 Ibid., p. 2. 
35 South African History Online, ‘Pan African Congress (PAC)’ (n.d.), available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/origins-formation-
sharpeville-and-banning-1959-1960, retrieved 8 September 2014. 
36 Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, pp. 48–53. 
37 Johnston, South Africa: Inventing the Nation, pp. 81–2. 
38 Bruckner de Villiers Research, The Rebirth; J. Strangwayes-Booth, A Cricket in the Thorn Tree: Helen Suzman and the Progressive 
Party (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976); Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power.  
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languages of English or Afrikaans). The majority of Commissioners were primarily concerned 
with the threat of African nationalism.39 They agreed that all ‘politically conscious’ black South 
Africans demanded adult suffrage, but argued that this was not because they supported the 
values of ‘personal freedom’, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘ordered progress’ that ‘Western democracy 
was conceived in’, but rather because they were inspired by ‘non-white nationalism’, which 
would ultimately be ‘totalitarian in its logical outcome’.40 In supporting a limited franchise that 
effectively allowed almost all whites, but only selected non-whites, to vote, the party yielded 
to a fear of African nationalism and arguably promoted the idea that some races are inherently 
inferior to others. Although the policy did demonstrate a partial rejection of apartheid ideology, 
the idea of a qualified franchise was an anathema to black political movements, and it was 
roundly rejected by them.41 Indeed, according to one commentator: 
 
The constitutional and franchise proposals adopted by the party in 1960 and 1962 were 
conservative and racist. Little notice was taken of the dissenting opinions of the black 
commission members …. The party was concerned with making the minimum concessions to 
buy off black protests and defuse the nationalist struggle while appeasing white prejudice.42  
 
By 1978, following the advent of the PFP, the party changed its stance to support universal 
adult franchise. The PFP explained that political rights must be shared by all South African 
citizens, and those systems that ‘could lead to racial domination are rejected’. It clearly stated that 
statutory or administrative discrimination on the grounds of race was unacceptable. In 
particular, PFP leader, van Zyl Slabbert, described how the party was ‘fundamentally 
opposed’ to legal measures that prevented different race groups from voluntarily associating 
together.43 The party saw the need for a break with the ideologies of the past, both liberal 
individualist and racist, and the adoption of new ideological forms (which would in turn 
legitimate monopoly capitalism).44 This stance begs the question, however, of why the 
parties continued to operate within a racially unequal legislative system. In its early 
formation, the PP declared parliament to be the main arena for its struggle. This choice by the 
PP led to many challenges and inconsistencies for the party, as it had to adapt its 
programmes to suit the wishes of at least a portion of the white electorate.45 In answering 
the question of whether participation in the apartheid 
 
political system, specifically parliament, conferred legitimacy on apartheid, liberal historian 
David Welsh argues that parliament ‘provided a platform, and media coverage ensured that 
both the critique of apartheid and the prospect of a more democratic and open society were 
kept before the public’, and that ultimately fundamental change to the system did eventually 
                                                          
39 B. Hackland, ‘Incorporationist Ideology as a Response to Political Struggle’, in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race, 
Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa (Harlow, Longman, 1987), pp. 374–5.  
40 D. Molteno, Molteno Report, Volume 1: Franchise Proposals and Constitutional Safeguards (South Africa, Progressive Party, 1960). 
41 Strangwayes-Booth, A Cricket in the Thorn Tree, p. 191. 
42 Hackland, ‘Incorporationist Ideology’, p. 371. 
43 F. van Zyl Slabbert, ‘The Nature of the South African Problem and the Progressive Federal Party’s Approach to its Solution’, in 
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, South Africa: A Chance for Liberalism? (Berlin, Liberal Verlag, 1985). 
44 B. Hackland, ‘The Economic and Political Context of the Growth of the Progressive Federal Party in South Africa, 1959–1978’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 7, 1 (1980), p. 13. 
45 See R. Erkens, ‘Limits and Prospects for a Liberal Policy in a Plural Society’, in Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, South Africa: A Chance 
for Liberalism?, p. 10. 
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come through Parliament (which, he clarifies, in no way diminishes the role played by extra- 
parliamentary movements).46 Regardless of justifications, working within parliament could 
be seen to legitimise systemic racism, and certainly challenged a universalised interpretation 
of non-racialism. 
 
Indeed, because of its role in the political system, the party was unable to maintain the 
multiracial party membership it had initially supported.47 In 1968, the Prohibition of 
Political Interference Act precluded individuals from different racial groups from being 
part of the same organisation.48 The PP decided to remain politically functional as a whites-
only party, but in 1978 the PFP explained that, once the Act was repealed, any non-white 
person who had previously been a member would automatically regain full membership of the 
party. In theory, then, the PFP supported non-racial membership, but this was never tested in 
practice until 1984, after the party became the DP.49 If the PP felt that multiracial membership 
was non-negotiable, it would have had to leave formal parliamentary politics, which the party 
chose not to do. At this stage then, non-racialism was, at best, a theoretical aspiration of the 
PFP, while racism was, in reality, practised by the party. 
 
This viewpoint sits in contrast to that of the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party, formed in 
1953, felt that multiracial membership was non-negotiable, with people of all races 
belonging to the organisation (although, similar to the PFP, they too supported a limited 
franchise in their early years, though they advocated universal suffrage from 1960, while 
the Progressives continued to support a qualified franchise until 1978).50 Certainly the 
Liberal Party were critical of multiracialism, with this being their main ‘point of argument’ 
with the Congress movement.51 Although non-racialism was a guiding principle of the 
party, membership of the party was never straightforward (as with the ANC and the PFP), 
with contestation in their early days over who they should target for party membership. 
Eventually, by 1956, the Liberal Party had new leadership and a clear vision of change 
based on mass non-violent pressure.52 In contrast to the PP, they focused on activist extra- 
parliamentary action, including boycotts and sit-ins. They also concentrated on socio- 
economic rights, whereas the PP focused on civil rights. Eventually the Liberal Party decided 
to disband in 1968, when the state introduced the Prohibition of Political Interference Act. 
In contrast to the PP, they would rather disband than legitimise the parliamentary system. 
What is notable is that although the Liberal Party did not win seats in the whites-only 
parliament, it attracted a substantial black membership, with the majority of delegates at 
                                                          
46 D. Welsh, in M. Shain (ed.), Opposing Voices, Liberalism and Opposition in South Africa Today (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2006) 
p. 12. 
47 Van Zyl Slabbert, ‘The Nature of the South African Problem’, p. 39. 
48 Republic of South Africa, Prohibition of Political Interference Act, No. 51 of 1968. 
49 In general, then, the PFP was largely supported by middle- to upper-class white, urban, English-speakers (see van Zyl Slabbert, ‘The 
Nature of the South African Problem’, p. 39. 
50 M. Cardo, ‘The Liberal Tradition in South Africa: Past and Present’, Focus, 65 (2012), p. 19; Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, 
Chapter 6. 
51 D. Everatt, ‘Nationalism, Class and Non-Racialism in the 1950s and Beyond: The Search for Convergence’, paper presented at the 
Yusuf Dadoo centenary conference, ‘Marxism, Non-Racialism and the Shaping of South Africa’s Liberation Struggle’, University of 
Johannesburg, September 2009, p. 11, available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/nationalism_class_nonracialism_1950s.pdf, retrieved 6 June 2015. 
52 Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, p. 145. 
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its 1961 conference being black.53 This is certainly a practical application of non-racialism 
that the PP and PFP could not claim. 
 
Economic Redress and Non-Racialism 
A key area to address when unpacking the PP’s, PFP’s and DP’s approach to non-racialism 
is their economic policy, as this points to the substantive way in which the parties intended to 
address the racially framed economic policies of apartheid. The PP, PFP and DP had a close 
association with big business,54 with critics claiming that it was concerned about preserving 
white economic privilege.55 The PFP supported liberal values of state neutrality and separation 
from capital. Capitalism and the free market should be allowed to flourish, and this would lead 
to the evolution of equal opportunity for all races. The party believed that the role of government 
is to distribute wealth, not to create it, as this was the role of business, but that all citizens 
have the right to an equal opportunity to share in the system of free economic enterprise.56 By 
the 1980s, the PFP may have been a party committed to non-racial values, but it did not focus 
on a need for redistributive economic policies. From this perspective, it could be argued that 
the party’s economic policies supported a universalised, non-racialisation understanding of 
non-racialism, in that they disregarded racial categories, seeing only individuals in a capitalist 
economy. However, their economic policies provided little sense of how to ‘level the playing 
field’ in order to create equal economic opportunities for all races. The party’s economic stance 
did not directly address structural racism in South Africa. Indeed, this suggests some future 
challenges that the DA would face in its approach to race and economic redress. 
 
A non-essentialised view of non-racialism sat in direct contrast to a second way in which the 
ANC conceptualised non-racialism during apartheid: that achieving non-racialism required the 
racialisation of economic policy, an approach that could be linked to their support for 
African nationalism. Here some leaders in the ANC argued that non-racialism developed in 
tandem with policies dealing with the national question,57 and strategies such as the national 
democratic revolution (NDR). Jordan explains that the ANC has always maintained that 
democracy, national liberation and non-racialism are inseparable; however, if democracy 
is to advance national liberation, it necessitates the empowerment of the most historically 
oppressed, being Africans, coloureds and Indians.58 In essence, the NDR entails the ‘liberation 
of Africans in particular and black people in general from political and economic bondage’.59  
Alongside political change, it was recognised that economic equality must be addressed in 
order to facilitate social transformation. There was a perceived need to go beyond legal equality 
to give non-racialism real meaning, and an understanding that achieving racial equality (in 
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the path to non-racialism) required fundamental structural social change.60 For some ANC 
thinkers, there was recognition that both attitudinal and institutional racism are functions 
of the development of South African capitalism in a colonial setting, which then found 
resonance within society at large.61 An institutionalised racial hierarchy was a consequence of 
productive relations structured and determined by colonialism of a special type (CST). This 
resonates with the SACP’s class-based approach to race relations. For the SACP, CST put 
bourgeois whites in the middle of a unique system of exploitation, which demonstrated 
characteristics of both an imperialist state and a colony; CST, however, emphasised the 
fundamental character of class rather than racial division.62 The effect of CST is that ‘all white 
classes benefit, albeit unequally and in different ways, from the internal colonial structure. 
Conversely, all black classes suffer national oppression, in varying degrees and in different 
ways’.63 To overcome this institutional racism, empowerment of blacks in general and black 
Africans in particular required the ‘radical restructuring of key aspects of the economy so as to 
destroy the material basis of the White racist power structure’. Cachalia alludes to this thinking 
during the liberation struggle as ‘anti-racist racism’ – as a path that can lead to the 
elimination of racial difference.64 This relates directly to the understanding of non-racialism 
as an emancipatory project. 
 
In concluding this historical overview, it is clear that the DA and it precursors did not have a 
uniform approach to the idea of non-racialism, and indeed neither did the ANC. For the ANC, 
both ideological and practical factors informed and compounded the theory and practice of 
non-racialism and explain to some degree the challenges, and at times seeming contradictions, 
in instrumentalising a vision of non-racialism.65 The DA’s historical approach to non-racialism 
too was complex. On the one hand, the parties were overtly racist where they supported a 
racially qualified franchise, whites-only party membership and operated within (and 
potentially legitimised) a racially delimited parliamentary system. On the other hand, the PP, 
PFP and DP subscribed to ideals that support a universalist, non-essentialist understanding of 
non-racialism. They theoretically placed individual identity and merit above that of racial 
groupings. When asked on public platforms if the implementation of PP policies could result in a 
black prime minister, the then leader of the party, Steytler, answered ‘yes, of course’. He 
explained that ‘it’s not the colour of a man that is important, it’s his merit as an individual’.66 In 
fact, in their approach to individual rights and capitalist economic policy, one could argue that 
they did not see race at all, even if their economic views on how to achieve a non-racial society 
required a long-term and very optimistic outlook on the role that the free market can play in 
creating meaningful ‘equal opportunity’. The internal contradictions in their approach to race 
flags concerns about whether the concept of non- racialism, for the post-apartheid DA, would 
equate to a universal, non-essentialised meaning or to a racialised form of multiracialism. Could 
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the PFP’s liberal ‘colour blind’ universalism support an ANC version of non-racialism that 
equated to universalised, generic humanism? 
 
New Forms of Non-Racialism: The Democratic Alliance Post-Apartheid 
How does the DA currently understand and instrumentalise non-racialism, and does it now 
present a coherent and comprehensive vision? In analysing its approach to non-racialism, it 
is also important to question whether the party’s policies and ideology have moved far from 
the liberal ideological roots of its predecessors. To interrogate the DA’s understanding of non- 
racialism, it is necessary to look at two key, and interlinked, areas: the party’s support for the 
‘individual political unit’ versus collective identity (and its concomitant approach to party 
membership), and economic policy, including racial redress. 
 
(In)visible Race: The Individual as Primary Political Unit 
The DA and its precursors largely regarded the individual as a primary political unit, as opposed 
to, for example, the National Party’s view that South Africans are, first and foremost, members 
of primordial groups (which struggle to relate to each other and thus function best under 
separate political systems). Thus liberalism for the DP, for example, meant ‘rejecting identity 
politics and overcoming ethnic, religious and racial differences to build united communities 
based on universal humanistic values’.67 For example, the 2002 DA Federal Constitution 
focused on traditional liberal values, such as the right to freedom of association, the 
rejection of unfair discrimination, and equality before the law. While the vision supported 
the idea that South Africans should aspire to relate to a ‘South African identity’ ahead of any 
other ascribed group identity (noting that this requires overcoming historical racial divisions), 
it still largely promoted a liberal notion of individual identity above group identity. Indeed, in 
an interview with this author in 2011, discussing her understanding of the concept ‘non-
racialism’, current DA party leader, Helen Zille, clearly favoured the liberal view of individual 
identity: 
 
My perception of non-racialism is approaching each person as a unique individual and not 
merely as some kind of representative of the category. So race is one identity marker and 
obviously given our history it is an important identity marker, but it is not the only identity 
marker. To make race subsume everything else and to believe that racial categories are the 
only ones that can define a person’s aspirations, views, positions, political philosophy, is 
fundamentally false … The common experience of a racial reality is certainly one identity but it 
cannot be seen as the defining identity imposed on other people … in a free society people 
don’t have an identity imposed upon them by virtue of racial category prescribed by others.68  
 
Yet, in contradiction to this approach, the DP in 1999 fought national elections with the campaign 
slogan Fight Back. Although not expressly racist, it certainly appeared to focus on group identity, 
drawing parallels with the reactionary white fear of assimilation with black African South 
Africans during apartheid, the Swart Gevaar (black fear). On the one hand, the DP was 
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standing for core liberal values, which centre on protecting the Constitution and acting as a 
check and balance to the government. In practice, however, many South Africans implicitly 
understood the party to be saying that South Africa was being overwhelmed by a black African 
majority that needed to be fought against. It certainly targeted racial minority groups.69 The 
DA’s Gavin Davis explained that the election campaign resulted in the party bonding with 
coloured, Indian and white voters, as each group harboured fears of being excluded in a 
country that, they perceived, was increasingly favouring Africanisation.70 This further points to 
the likelihood that the ‘fight back’ slogan compounded already racialised electoral politics. It 
certainly did not strengthen a view that the DP was supporting non-racialism, or individual 
rather than collective identity. 
 
It was only in late 2004, after a party-wide ‘visioning process’, that the DA, for the first 
time, started to use the term ‘non-racialism’ explicitly in its documents and vision, and in so 
doing presented a more nuanced view of individual versus collective identity in a South African 
setting. DA party leader Tony Leon listed five ‘cardinal principles’ for which the DA stood, the 
second of which was ‘non-racialism and diversity’. For Leon, although the individual should be 
the ‘touchstone of value in our society’, individual identities are shaped by the communities in 
which they live. He equates non-racialism and diversity to the idea that everyone is equal even 
if they have differences of religion, culture, and so on. The party acknowledges the impact of 
apartheid racism and exploitation and the concomitant need for measures to increase access 
to opportunity for those ‘fellow citizens who were deprived and oppressed in the past’. 
However, Leon is very clear that, from his perspective, the answer to racism is ‘not more 
racism’; the DA will not ‘put colour above all else’ in terms of jobs and public services. Thus the 
party believes in ‘diversity’, but not the ANC’s version of ‘representivity’; where 
representativeness is based on the idea that only someone from a particular group can 
represent that group.71  
 
Leon stressed that the ANC’s perspectives on ‘demographic representivity’ ignored individual 
differences within race groups.72 Certainly, from his perspective, the world view of the DA, 
which sees the individual as the building block of society, is a fundamentally different view 
from that of the ANC, which sees ‘the racial group as the building block of society’. Thus Leon 
was very critical of the ANC’s approach to non-racialism. He felt that President Thabo Mbeki 
had continually ‘played the race card’, undermining what the true principle of non-racialism 
should entail: not seeing race.73 Leon explained that ‘to simply start a racial scorecard and say 
we have not transformed unless we have X percentage blacks and X percentage whites, is 
actually a re-racialisation … you’re saying that the only antidote to racism is more racism’.74 
While at times recognising the complex manner in which South Africans ascribe a social 
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identity, and noting historical racial issues, the DA, at this point in its trajectory, largely 
avoided references to racial identity, rather viewing the individual as the primary political 
unit. On the surface, this presents a non-essentialised view of non-racialism; however, it 
sidesteps the reality of socio-economic inequality experienced largely along racial cleavages. 
 
Nearly 10 years later, this tension between embracing racial (or group) identity, as experienced 
through the lived reality of most South Africans, and liberalism’s focus on individual identity had 
become a growing challenge for the party. As its Federal Chairperson, Wilmot James, explains: 
 
… liberalism’s vision of non-racialism presents an intellectual and moral quagmire. If South 
Africa is on a journey to a non-racial society … should we use apartheid’s racial taxonomy to 
determine the categories of persons disadvantaged by discrimination to qualify for broad 
based black economic empowerment (BBBEE)? Is this not, as some liberals aver, simply not 
perpetuating the saliency of race? Does it leave the principles of non-racialism and equality 
under the law intact?75  
 
The party’s general response to this ‘quagmire’, evident in many of its policies and public 
statements, has been to use disadvantage (mostly historical), rather than race, as a criterion 
for preferential ‘opportunity’: ‘previous disadvantaged, not race, should guide redress or we risk 
reverting to the kind of backwards, divisive thinking that has defined our history’.76 Zille further 
explains: 
 
Obviously some South Africans, often on a racial basis, have faced great oppression in their 
lives and lack of opportunity … But the point is race is not the only marker of that. Of course we 
believe in equity and affirmative action but not as an imposition of racial categories as the 
only marker of redress and not in the way that sees redress as a zero sum game … the DA 
looks very much at increasing opportunities and not at manipulating outcomes and certainly 
not through imposed racial categories.77  
 
As the party developed, it become,evident that there was,an ever increasing need to accept the 
salience of racial identity; it was unclear how they envisaged doing this while still criticising the 
idea of representativity, and holding on to an individualised, liberal notion of identity. Certainly 
this resulted in an approach to non-racialism that was becoming increasingly contradictory, 
even in light of the party’s own recognition of the ‘quagmire’ it faces. 
 
The Necessity of Embracing Racial Identity: Rebranding the DA to Attract 
Black African Support 
As South Africa’s democracy evolved, it was becoming increasingly clear that, if the DA hoped to 
move from the margins of opposition into government, it would need to attract black African 
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support. This is not to say that South Africans vote along only racial lines;78 however, evidence 
suggests that the DA was strongly associated with protecting white, or minority, interests, which 
alienated it from large sectors of society, and that it was not seen as a viable political alternative 
for many black African voters.79 Indeed, DA MPs conceded that ‘race is central to voting in South 
Africa’.80 Analysis of the motivations of South African voters does show that the relationship 
between race and party images dominates voter choice; however, voters are primarily motivated 
by inclusivity rather than exclusivity. Almost all voters think that their preferred party is 
inclusive of all South Africans, yet they do not regard ‘other’ parties as inclusive – and these 
notions of inclusivity and exclusivity are largely race-based.81 It is thus not surprising that the 
DA wanted to change perceptions that it had previously created of being an exclusive ‘minority 
party’. 
 
There were different ways in which the DA attempted to change their party image. In 2004, 
Leon stated that the DA’s vision of non-racialism included implementing a programme to 
achieve ‘better diversity in our party’s membership and our leadership structures’; in other 
words, to increase support in black African communities. The document called for DA leaders 
to work closely with black African DA activists.82 Although framed by a perceived political 
necessity to mobilise voter support, this stance presented a clear tension between the ‘non- 
racial’, ‘individual’-as-primary-political-unit approach, and an essentialised view of racial 
identity. When Helen Zille took the leadership reins in 2007, the DA began overtly to rebrand 
itself in order to attract black African support and be deemed more inclusive, a party ‘that 
delivers for all’. Zille, in particular, targeted black African voters, campaigning in townships. 
She frequently and publicly spoke in a black African language (Xhosa) to break the perceived 
bonds of exclusivity in the DA. In rebranding, the party hoped to lose its image as a white, or 
indeed minority only, party.83 This distinct change of image before the 2009 election 
amounted, according to Southern, to the keenest attempt, out of all South African political 
parties, to do justice to the idea of ‘unity in diversity’: ‘it conveys the idea that the party is 
paying more than lip service to post-apartheid South Africa’s core principle of non-
racialism’.84  
 
Under the new DA brand, Zille, in contrast to earlier DA writings, actually referred to race 
groups. She explained that, under apartheid, ‘blacks85 were far poorer than whites and had 
worse education, housing and health care’ and that the remedy for this is to ‘give full and equal 
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opportunity to black people’.86 She was quick, however, to decry the manner in which the ANC 
implements policies that are intended to address racial inequality. Moving away from Leon’s 
position of criticising the ANC for its approach to ‘representivity’, she instead criticises the 
party for being a closed, crony society, where the prospects of ‘each individual are determined 
by his links and access to the small leadership network in the ruling party’.87 In this way, Zille 
is able to criticise the ruling party but avoid a negative focus on race that could be seen as 
indicating a lack of support for race-based economic transformation policies. It is also perhaps 
indicative of a DA that may, in the future, more explicitly recognise the social reality of racial 
identities affirmed by most South Africans, and choose to support policies that are based on 
racial representativity. These viewpoints certainly marked a change in the party’s direction 
regarding the salience of race-based identity. The party may not have moved so far as to support 
race-based policies; however, it was a noticeable shift from focusing on minority concerns. 
 
This inclusive approach to campaigning continued in the lead-up to the 2014 election. 
Here the DA appealed to black African voters through identifying with their history: that of 
being oppressed under apartheid. In order to undo the negative perceptions regarding its 
role in the apartheid system, the DA attempted to reframe its past through an association with 
anti- apartheid activists. Notably they used the Freedom Charter to rebrand their history, 
stating that ‘[w]e recognise the importance of the Freedom Charter in articulating a non- 
racial vision for South Africa’,88 and then attempted to weaken the ANC’s ownership of this 
vision by stating that ‘the Charter’s claim that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
black and white”, is being undermined by the ANC’s project of racial nationalism’. The party 
further linked PP leader Helen Suzman with Mandela, and used her legacy to claim a 
position in society as a non-racial party that always rejected apartheid and were pioneers 
(within the system) in the fight against apartheid. Indeed, the party explicitly links itself 
with Mandela when they state that their current vision includes: ‘the idea that South Africa is 
“for all”, or as Nelson Mandela famously said, “belongs to all who live in it, both black and 
white”’.89  
 
Membership 
It is evident that the party believes that much of the work that needs to be done to allow potential 
black African voters to align themselves with them is actually to show racial change, or what 
they call ‘diversity’, within their party. Indeed, the party and its precursors had only white 
leaders (including Colin Eglin, Zach de Beer, Tony Leon and Helen Zille) until 2015, when the 
first black leader, Mmusi Maimane, was elected. Furthermore, a merger with the New National 
Party (NNP), although a failure within a short period of time, left the DA with a membership 
base infused with ex-NNP members, few of whom were black Africans. This membership 
base, in conjunction with the original DP membership base, which promoted ideas such at the 
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minority-group-targeted ‘fight back’ campaign, would have strengthened the perception that 
the DA is a home for minority race groups. 
 
There is, however, undoubtedly a growing cadre of black African leadership in the party, and the 
party has made significant strides to deliberately change the racial composition within the 
party’s senior leadership.90 The majority of the candidates for premier in the nine provinces in 
the 2014 elections were black African.91 Most significant is the election of Maimane after Zille 
decided not to contest the leadership position in 2015. His rise the leadership has certainly 
been swift. He became active in the party only in 2010, yet stood as the DA’s mayoral 
candidate for Johannesburg in the 2011 elections. He was elected DA leader in parliament 
after the 2014 elections. The leadership changes in the party are not unproblematic. 
Commentators suggest that there is a cadre of mostly black African ‘young Turks’ driving a 
particular agenda in the party.92 The party denies this, claiming that ‘the idea of a black 
[African] caucus is a myth’.93 The perception exists, however, that the top leadership of the 
party, and Zille in particular, have to mediate between this group and the ‘old guard’: ‘[t]here’s 
a group of older conservatives that is still powerful in the DA’, who ‘are afraid that the young 
black African professionals who are rising up the ranks could take over’.94 Notwithstanding the 
internal racial dynamics of the party, the DA face the challenge of being seen to identify with 
black African South Africans while still holding firm to the relatively liberal, non-essentialised 
view of non-racialism.95 This is a challenge, we shall see, that manifests itself even more starkly 
in the party’s approach to economic policy. 
 
Economic Policy and the Role of the State: The Coalface of Non-Racialism 
Historically, the DA broadly supported the idea of a free market economy, believing that 
economic development in a system of free entrepreneurship, guided by correct policies, will 
stimulate economic growth. This growth would ultimately cancel out any historical inequalities 
in the system.96 These ‘guiding’ policies were fairly narrowly conceived. The 2002 Federal 
Constitution, for example, supported ‘growth in prosperity created through the exercise of the 
market economy’, seeing a role for government only to ensure that ‘no one must be left behind’; 
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in particular, providing access to education and promoting the progressive realisation of access to 
social security, housing and health care. Leon argued that there was no need for economic policy 
to target certain groups specifically: ‘[i]f we are fixated on racialism – if we’re fixated on redress, 
rather than on economic growth, we aren’t going to get the unemployed into employment’.97  
 
This approach is markedly different from the ANC’s current focus on racially based economic 
policies, such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE). It must be noted 
at this juncture that there is no obvious way to interpret the ANC’s current approach to non- 
racialism; contemporary views on non-racialism must be extrapolated more broadly from ANC 
economic, political and social policies, and from direct comments on non-racialism made in a 
range of sources, including NEC documents, ANC discussion documents, policy documents, 
speeches and interviews, although these comments are not widespread, nor offer any detailed 
vision.98 To understand fully the ANC’s current approach to non-racialism, it is necessary to 
look beyond uncomplicated, symbolic references to the term ‘non-racialism’ and examine 
ANC policies more generally. As discussed previously, a primary aim of the ANC was, as a 
liberation movement, and is, as a party in power, to work towards the NDR. For the ANC, a 
non-racial future can occur only as an ‘act of black self-emancipation, with the African people 
taking the lead in their own liberation’.99 To counter the consequences of apartheid, 
structural transformation of society is required, with the ANC directing the state and giving 
leadership ‘to the motive forces in all spheres of influence and pillars of our transformation 
project’,100 where ‘motive forces’ generally refer to ‘drivers of change’ including ‘black workers 
and black communities’.101 In other words, if the system caused the crime, then building a 
non-racial South Africa requires a ‘transformation of the material conditions themselves’.102 
In practice, this means that it is necessary to recognise, accept and act on racial difference in 
the present as a means to achieve a non-racial future, reflecting Cachalia’s references to ‘anti-
racist racism’. This includes the conscious and deliberate re-racialisation of South Africa by 
undertaking a host of measures, including affirmative action, to ensure that the results of 
decades of systematic discrimination and denial of job opportunities are reversed.103 This is, in 
other words, a racialised approach to economic development that is in contrast to the DA’s 
historical ‘colour-blind’ view on economic policy. 
 
However, as the salience of racial identity became more difficult to ignore, the DA, under 
Zille’s new leadership, started calling for more state intervention that implicitly aligned with 
racial categories. The DA was now accepting that you can’t leave everything to the market and 
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that the state needs to provide some form of welfare intervention.104 Although Zille stressed a 
desire to limit the ‘wrong kind of state intervention’, she explained that liberals in plural and 
unequal societies need to find credible ways of addressing poverty, when wealth and poverty 
largely coincide with racial categories.105 Where the party had acknowledged the historical 
salience of race in regard to poverty and inequality, it now placed a focus on redressing 
the racial legacy of apartheid. The move to rethink the role of the state was exemplified in 
the DA’s 2009 and 2014 manifestos. Both expressly mentioned the need for redress for 
historically disadvantaged (that is, black African, coloured and Indian) South Africans. The 
2014 manifesto explains that ‘the nature and extent of economic exclusion under apartheid … 
require active measures in support of redress’ (emphasis in original).106 The manifestos 
also supported BBBEE as a means to empower ‘disadvantaged South Africans’. The discussion 
of BBBEE is significant, as the party, in a noticeable change from its 2004 manifesto, states 
that it is ‘fully behind’ BBBEE, as ‘removing the discriminatory laws of the apartheid 
government is not enough on its own to empower disadvantaged South Africans’.107 The 
2014 manifesto is clear, however, that broad-based empowerment must lead to economic 
growth, and the existing policy should be reformed. It is also clear that redress of historical 
inequality should not be based simply on race: ‘[w]e believe that race and disadvantage are 
not the same, but that a significant correlation between race and disadvantage remains 
today’.108 Supporting any race-based policy, however, signalled a new direction in the 
party’s conceptualisation of non-racialism. 
 
In the DA’s 2012 Plan for Growth and Jobs, there was again recognition that the state must 
play an important, active role in reducing the legacy of race-based inequality and poverty. 
It acknowledges the need for partial state intervention in the economy, including providing 
critical infrastructure, correcting market failures and ensuring fairness by promoting broad- 
based ownership and participation. A key section focuses on the need to break down ‘barriers 
to inclusion’, where fairly wide-ranging state intervention is called for in the form of financial 
incentives to enhance BBBEE, among others. However, this support for some degree of racial 
categorisation by no means pointed to a step change in the DA’s approach to group/race-based 
identity. The Plan still used a liberal lens in its vision of ‘building an equal opportunity society’, 
talking about those who have opportunities and those who don’t, and it only very occasionally 
referred to racial categories. Aside from references to BBBEE, the word ‘black’ is used 10 
times in the 88-page document. Of the other traditional race groups ‘white’ is mentioned three 
times, ‘Coloured’ once and Indian twice, with the bulk of the use of these terms in the historical 
overview.109 This is not a policy perspective that uses race-based analysis. In this light, it views 
the political unit as the individual and not a member of an ascribed group. Where citizens are 
grouped, it is largely along income lines (or an implicit class analysis) of poor or wealthy, gender 
lines, or by age group. Thus, from an economic perspective, the DA continued to put forward 
                                                          
104 Interview with Zwelethu Jolobe, University of Cape Town, 24 January 2014. 
105 H. Zille, ‘For an Inclusive Society’, speech delivered at the Liberal International Congress, Belfast, UK, 17 May 2008. 
106 DA election manifesto, 2014, p. 16. 
107 DA election manifesto, 2014. 
108 Ibid., p. 18. 
109 DA, ‘The DA’s Plan for Growth and Jobs’ (28 July 2012), retrieved 15 January 2014 via www.da.org.za/,subsequently replaced by 
the 2014 version. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
19 
 
a disjointed view of non-racialism; acknowledging the need for state intervention, which at 
times has a racial dimension, but more broadly trying to avoid racial grouping. There is neither 
a strong commitment to non-racialisation, nor a clearly multiracial approach to non-
racialism. 
 
Fractures in Façade: The Employment Equity Bill 
The challenge of reconciling race-based economic redress with liberal values came to a head 
in 2013, when the party voted in favour of the Employment Equity Amendment Bill of 2012. 
The Bill effectively supported setting racial targets that take into account national and regional 
demographic profiles. Arguably, this contradicted many of the core values that the DA had 
stood for. For example, the Federal Chairperson previously strongly objected to the idea of 
setting racial quotas, stating that 
 
if national or regional demographics determine opportunity, the state needs to be able to 
define what determines a person as ‘Black’ or ‘Coloured’, ‘Indian’ or ‘White’ in order to 
assess what they qualify for and which demographic they represent. How will the state 
determine this? With a pencil test?.110  
 
Certainly, according to some commentators, ‘DA support for this kind of racial engineering 
will come as a shock to many … It also betrays the non-racial principles for which the party 
has historically stood’.111  
 
This change of heart did not last long, however; within weeks, and after a Federal meeting, the 
party rescinded its support for the Bill. Zille, apologising, stated that ‘[w]e dropped the ball 
…. Our representatives on the portfolio committee were inadequately prepared’, and that 
submissions on the bill were rushed through the portfolio committee.112 Ex-DA senior 
analyst van Onselen argued that this apology was disingenuous, as the representatives to whom 
Zille refers were not in fact poorly prepared; they had simply had the wrong position. DA 
representatives had previously commented on the Bill in committee meetings, and in fact 
 
stated, when the final bill was tabled for adoption, that the DA ‘fully supports the constitutional 
provisions for affirmative action and the objectives of the Employment Equity Act to promote 
redress and diversity in the South African labour market’. The DA’s change of stance on the 
bill was, according to van Onselen, ‘a matter of profound ideological disagreement’.113 The 
DP had indeed strongly opposed the original bill when it was introduced into parliament in 
1998. Leon stated at the time that it was a ‘pernicious piece of social engineering … it does 
nothing for the poor … it uses race as a proxy to advancement’ and that ‘[g]oup-based thinking 
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as proposed in the Bill formed the cornerstone of apartheid’.114 The DA’s changing stance on 
the Employment Equity Bill highlights fundamental contradictions in trying to apply a non- 
essentialist version of non-racialism in a country with a racially infused history and high levels 
of inequality distributed along racial lines. The contestation over the bill brings to a focal point 
the question of what exactly the DA means when it says it supports the ideal of non-racialism. 
 
To address the extensive criticism the party faced over its seemingly confused stance on 
employment equity, the party held a federal conference to discuss its policy on ‘economic 
inclusion’: in effect, race-based policies. At the end of 2013, it disseminated a policy on 
economic inclusion that essentially acknowledges the need to implement race-based redress 
policies in a ‘transitional phase’ in order to overcome the legacy of apartheid. The document 
focuses on how the racial dimensions of apartheid and the ‘exclusionary racial culture’ created 
a context where the circumstances into which one is born significantly affect one’s life chances. 
A focus on race-based redress is necessary, as formal equality does not ensure a just society. 
Sections of the paper talk about poverty, inequality, unemployment and education in racial 
terms, providing statistics according to racial groupings of black Africans, whites, Indians and 
coloureds. The party also explicitly supports the new broad-based BEE scorecard. They will 
measure the success of their redress programmes by the opportunities that have been 
created for ‘black advancement’. It is thus clear in this document that the DA has, more 
than ever before, embraced the idea of racial categorisation. The documents contains the 
term ‘black’ (not counting references to BBE) 31 times in 22 pages, in stark contrast to the 
jobs and growth plan of only a year earlier. This is a distinct change from the use of racially 
neutral terms, such as ‘disadvantaged’, conventionally used by the party. This new economic 
policy shares much with the ANC’s implicit approach to achieving non-racialism through 
racial categorisation. However, the ANC is unclear about how long racial categorisation is 
needed for, while the DA stresses that race-based policies should be short-lived. They do not 
want to ‘entrench’ race as the ‘determining factor of our future’, but rather support a 
transitional phase, in which race-based redress is used to overcome apartheid legacies. In this 
way, they seek to retain their long-term vision of a ‘non-racial society’.115 Indeed, the 2014 
election manifesto is clear that redress programmes are ‘transitional measures that must be 
subject to regular review’.116  
 
Although the party, in a distinct change from the past, now expressly refers to race groups, it 
does still try, as far as possible, to use not only race as a delineator: they use terms such as 
‘previously disadvantaged’ or ‘creating diversity’. When they state that ‘[w]e recognise the need 
to promote economic inclusion with a specific focus on previously disadvantaged individuals 
who faced legislated and institutionally organised exclusion’117 (emphasis added), they are, 
given apartheid’s racially legislated history, plainly referring to individuals who are black (in 
its broadest sense). Not using racial terminology may be one way in which they attempt to 
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reconcile liberalism’s focus on the individual with policies that focus on group identity. It is, 
however, clear that the party now supports race-based policies. 
 
This point of view is clearly exemplified through the discourse on non-racialism that emerged 
between party leadership candidates in the 2015 DA electoral congress. Wilmot James, who 
challenge Maimane for the leadership position, has consistently argued that non-racialism does 
not equate to racial essentialisation, and that ‘race is a bad proxy’.118 Indeed his supporters 
are clear that they backed him because of his views on race; BEE beneficiaries, for example, 
should be chosen for socio-economic disadvantage, not race.119 Maimane’s views on non-
racialism are not altogether clear, having been articulated in various ways on different 
platforms.120 During his leadership campaign, he explained that ‘[w]e must recognise that race 
shaped our identities and opportunities, but we mustn’t keep people trapped in racial boxes. 
Our end goal must be to transcend race so that all may be truly free, both socially and 
economically’.121 He later becomes clearer about race essentialisation, explaining that he self-
identifies as a black person and wants ‘first and foremost’ to be seen as black. He 
acknowledges that a difference between him and James is that he ‘recognises race as a proxy 
for disadvantage’.122 In his first speech as party leader, he stated clearly that ‘[n]on racialism 
does not mean being colour-blind’ and ‘[i]f you don’t see black then you don’t see me at all’; 
he did add, however, that skin colour should not define South Africans indefinitely.123 These 
statements resonate to a large extent with Cachalia’s definition of the ANC’s ‘anti-racist 
racism’. Maimane’s non-racialism certainly recognises the importance of racial 
categorisation, equating non-racialism to multiracialism, rather than an earlier DA version 
(and indeed James’ view) of anti-essentialisation of race. 
 
Contradictions in the DA towards racialisation are not new. The party has in theory 
consistently expressed loyalty to the idea of non-racialisation, with its focus on individual 
above group; yet, in practice, it has lobbied racial groupings for support, as is evident through 
campaigns such as ‘fight back’, and, more recently, in its appeal to black Africans. A related 
contradiction is the tension between liberal values and the need to redress race-based 
inequalities created historically. How does a party that theoretically subscribes to the 
individual as the key political unit deal with policy implications that have historically 
affected a group? The DA tried to do this by staying close to the principle that equal 
opportunities for individuals will eradicate race-based inequality. Indeed its current vision 
still states that ‘positive action must be targeted at individuals who still suffer the effects of 
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discrimination, not at groups’.124 Their 2015 Values Charter also reaffirms the importance of 
building ‘successful individuals’, who can realise their full potential ‘as individuals’.125 
However, it has become clear that the longue durée of eradicating racial inequality through a 
focus on individual economic growth means it may be more difficult to generate support from 
the majority of the voting public in South Africa. 
 
It is thus unsurprising that the party has recently started to support race-based polices 
explicitly. It is arguable that many in the DA would like race not to be the litmus test for group 
identity that requires redress; they would favour the idea of ‘disadvantage’. This is problematic, 
however, both in the context of a racially unequal society and in the context of government 
policies that expressly focus on racial categorisation, in particular BBBEE and affirmative 
action. The party is an opposition party in a country with a highly racialised past, governed by 
an African nationalist party. They may not ideally choose to engage in supporting racialised 
group thinking, but they function within a circumscribed political context. The DA is forced 
to deal with and acknowledge racial fault lines. The challenge for the party is that it cannot 
easily marry liberal concepts with multiracial ones, and it is a multiracial understanding of 
non-racialism that the majority of the South African electorate seem to relate to.126 Thus even 
if many in the party may wish to subscribe to a non-essentialised version of non-racialism, 
they have arguably turned down the path of multiracialism. 
 
Conclusion: New Forms of Non-Racialism or a Dying Ideal? 
For the DA (and indeed the ANC), their current conceptualisation and instrumentalisation of 
non-racialism faces the same contradictions and inconsistencies that they have historically, 
albeit in different iterations. The DA is caught between traditional liberal notions, where non-
racialism equates to universal, colour-blind equality, and a contemporary support for race-
based economic policies. This echoes tensions in the ANC between more a universalist, 
humanist vision of non-racialism and an analysis correlating race and socio-economic class, 
following the idea of CST, which results in the essentialisation of race. Arguably, both the DA 
and the ANC have, in effect, instrumentalised a view of non-racialism that reflects and 
supports multiracialism. For both parties, transitional race-based policies are necessary (in 
the short term for the DA and longer term for the ANC) in order to achieve ‘true’ non-
racialism. These contradictory approaches to the ideal of non-racialism also play a divisive 
role within both political parties. The DA’s previous federal chairperson stated that ‘at the 
heart of the ruling party [ANC] there is one fundamental fracture: non-racialism’.127 Surely 
that fracture belongs to the DA too. 
 
What does this tell us about the concept of non-racialism in South Africa today? Is non- 
racialism to be understood as meaning, in effect, the racialisation of economy and society? 
Arguably there is little vestige left of a vision of non-racialism that equates to the idea that 
race is a social construct and that the state can and should be ‘colour blind’ – in essence, what 
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Luthuli may have been thinking when he referred to a ‘non-racial democratic South Africa 
which upholds the rights of all who live in our country to remain there as full citizens with 
equal rights and responsibilities with all others’.128 In many ways, non-racialism is now more 
akin to Cachalia’s ‘anti-racist racism’. The concern here, as voiced by the ANC, is that racial 
categorisation creates the risk of freezing racial and cultural categories, rather than allowing for 
organic development.129 As Cachalia asks, ‘is a stable, essentialised subject with a fixed identity 
still required for a non-racial project?’130 He questions, in other words, whether is it necessary 
to accept a fixed sense of racial identity in the short term to achieve non-racialism in the long 
term. This analysis of the positions of the DA on non-racialism resonates with Taylor’s 
argument that what remains of the project of non-racialism is, at the elite level, ‘largely a 
politics of non- performative incantation; where to simply express commitment to non-
racialism has become ritualistic, but has no deep effect on the incontrovertible truth that South 
Africa remains a highly racialised society’.131 Instead, current approaches to non-racialism on 
the part of the DA and the ANC reinforce the racialisation of society. Non-racialism now 
equates to, on the one hand, multiracialism, and, on the other, racialisation. Was non-
racialism always (at least on the part of the ANC) conceived in this light or is it a dying ideal? 
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